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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
HERBERT F. SMART as Director of the Utah
State Department of Finance, and GOLDEN L.
ALLEN, State Treasurer,
Defendants/Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District Judge

RICHARD J. LEEDY
Twelve Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellants.

BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS, of
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY ANN PRETTYMAN, Administratrix
of the Estate of Ted LeRoy Prettyman, deceased,
CALVIN W. RAWLINGS, BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS, WAYNE L. BLACK, JOHN L. BLACK,
and RICHARD C. DIBBLEE, dba RAWLINGS,
ROBERTS & BLACK, and A. JOHN RUGGERI,
Plain tiffs /Respondents,

Case No.

12493

vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
HERBERT F. SMART as Director of the Utah
State Department of Finance, and GOLDEN L.
ALLEN, State Treasurer,
Defendants/ Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the administratrix of an estate
and her attorneys to recover from the administrators of
the State Insurance Fund attorney fees based upon the
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proposition that in 'Vorkmen's Compensation cases the
insurance carrier is required to participate in the payment of attorneys fees and costs as its interest may appear. See Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews Inc., 19
lJtah 2d 80, 426 P.2d 233 (1967).
This latter case is based upon a construction of
Section 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Decedent, Ted LeRoy Prettyman, was killed in an
on the job accident on August 30, 1965, (R. 5, 12).
Thereafter and on November 2, 1965, the Industrial
Commission awarded to Shirley Ann Prettyman, the
widow of decedent, the total sum of $19,245.00 ( R.
5, 12).
Slhirley Ann Prettyman then employed John
Ruggeri in January, 1966 to prosecute an action against
H. E. Lowdermilk Company or any other person responsible for the death of her decedent.
Thereafter, Mr. Ruggeri associated with him the
other plaintiffs in the case who are members of the firm
of Rawlings, Roberts & Black.
Action was commenced by plaintiff, Shirley Ann
Prettyman on the 14th day of June, 1966 in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division against H. E. Lowdermilk Company for the
wrongful death of her decedent.
On the nth day of August, 1967, the action was
settled for the sum of $65,000.00. The settlement accounting with Shirley Ann Prettyman is set out in an
2

Exhibit attached to the Affidavit of Plaintiffs in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment ( R. 26) .
It therein appears that Mrs. Prettyman was given
credit for the entire amount of the Industrial Commission award of $19,245.00. No attorneys fee was
charged her on that amount and her fee was figured
only on the net after the full amount of the award had
been subtracted.

At this time the Industrial Commission had paid
to plaintiff, Shirley Ann Prettyman, the sum of
$5,985.00. The settlement was made after the date of
the Worthen case. That case was decided on April 1,
1967.
At the time of the settlement a dispute developed
between the State Insurance Fund and the plaintiffs
on the subject of how much attorneys fees should be
paid. Plaintiffs took the position that the interest of the
Insurance Fund in the lawsuit was the amount of the
award and that therefore they should pay one-third
(1/3) of the $19,245.00 amounting to a fee of $6,415.00.
The State Insurance Fund took the position that
plaintiffs were only entitled to a fee on the $5,985.00
or a fee of $1,995.00.
'Vith the consent of both parties the $5,985.00
was placed in a savings account in trust to await the
determination of this dispute.
On the 28th day of December, 1967 on the agreement of plaintiffs and the State Insurance Fund, plain-
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tiffs were paid $1,995.00 out of the trust fund, being
the undisputed portion of the attorney fee. This left
remaining in the trust fund a balance of $3,990.00. This
latter amount is the total of the judgment rendered
against the defendants in this case.

POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I.
Since the settlement agreement of the third-party
suit was entered into after the decision in Worthen vs.
Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., the law as set forth therein
is controlling and defendants should be required to pay
their fair share of the attorneys fees in the third-party
suit.
POINT II.
The amount of the attorneys fees to be paid by
defendants should be based upon the total award made
in favor of the decedent's dependents as this appears
to be the interest of the defendants in the recovery.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SINCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
OF THE THIRD-PARTY SUIT WAS EN4

TERED INTO AFTER THE DECISION IN
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF AND ANDREWS, INC., THE LAW AS SET FORTH
THEREIN IS CONTROLLING AND DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PAY
THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE ATTORNEYS
FEES IN THE THIRD-PARTY SUIT.
In the case of McCQTlJnell vs. Commissioner of
Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d 394 (1962), the
Utah Supreme Court had held that insurance carriers
were not obligated to share in the costs and expenses
including attorneys fees in a recovery against a thirdparty in a case in which the carrier had become obligated to pay workmen's compensation.
Thereafter and on April 1, 1967 this Court overruled the McConnell case in the case of Worthen vs.
Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P.2d
223 ( 1967).
Thus the settlement of the case against H. E.
Lowdermilk Company on August 11, 1967, came some
four months after the law required that insurance carriers participate in attorneys fees in a case such as this.
It is and was defendants' contention that since the
death, the award and the filing of suit pre-dated the
1Vorthen case to apply it to this case would be applying
it retroactively.
'Ve submit that the significant time is the time of
settlement. At that time the parties obviously contracted
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in reliance upon the law as it at that time existed. The
settlement accounting (R. 26) indicates without doubt
that the parties believed the carrier would be required
to participate in the attorneys fees since no attorneys
fees were charged to Mrs. Prettyman on the amount
of the award she had received from the Industrial Comm1ss1on. This would indicate that the lawyers were
looking to the carrier for recompense for this portion
of the recovery.
The case of Williarns v. Utah State Department
of Finance, 23 Utah 2d 438, 464 P .2d 596 ( 1970) , is
not to the contrary. In that case all of the occurrences
had transpired prior to the decision in the Worthen case.
Most important of all, the settlement had been made
prior to the decision in the Worthen case. It is at the
time of the settlement that the attorneys fees become
due. This is the time when all of the rights of the parties
are settled and determined.
The time of settlement was indicated to be the controlling time in the case of Draper vs. Travelers Insurance Company, 429 F.2d 44 (10 CCA - 1970). It was
held that the parties settled the case in reliance upon
the law as it was at that time.

POINT II.
THE AMOUNT OF THE ATTORNEYS
FEES TO BE PAID BY DEFENDANTS
SHOULD BE BASED UPON THE TOTAL
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A \V ARD lVIADE IN FAVOR OF THE DECEDENT'S DEPENDENTS AS THIS APPEARS TO
HE THE INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANTS
IN THE RECOVERY.
Section 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated provides in
part as follows:
"If any recovery is obtained against such third
person it shall be disbursed as follows:
( 1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear.

(2) The person liable for compensation payment shall be reimbursed in full for all payments
made.
( 3) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for
compensation."

Thus the attorney fees are to be charged against
the parties as "their interests may appear."
Obviously the State Fund is obligated to pay the
full amount of the award of $19,245.00 and their interest
is the amount of that liability. Of this it was relieved
by the settlement and hence not only from the standpoint of interest but also of equity and justice it should
contribute to the fee and costs in proportion to the
amount it has been saved.
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Certainly the interest of the Fund is more than just
the money it has paid out at the time of settlement. If
the third-party verdict was not as much as the compensation award the Fund would only get credit for the
smaller amount and would have to pay the balance of
the award. Its interest has to be the amount of the award.
Under defendants' theory the fees paid by the
carrier would depend upon when recovery was made
from the third-party wrongdoer.
If the recovery was made before compensation
payments were made the carrier would pay no fees
yet would have been relieved of paying the award. On
the other hand, if all compensation payments had been
made at the time of the recovery the carrier would pay
fees on the entire award.

Then too, from an equitable standpoint the attorney
should not charge on the amount plaintiff would
recover without his aid. As in the case at bar, Shirley
Ann Prettyman was awarded $19,245.00 without the
aid of her attorneys. She paid no fee on that part of the
recovery (R. 26) and the Fund that benefited by this
recovery should pay its share of the fee based on the
amount of the award.
The following cases allowed attorney fees on the
amount of the award and not the amount of compensaid paid: Soliday v. Hires Turner Glass Co., (Pa)
142 A.2d 425 ( 1958); Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc.,
(N.J. 111 A.2d 261 (1955); Dante v. William T. Got-
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clii, Inc., (N.J.) 111A.2d267 (1955); Yeager v. Hecknwn, 158 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Wall v. Conn.
IV clding & Machine Co., 197 Pa. Super. 360, 179 A.2d
i35 (1962).
Defendants claim that a judgment might be entered
against the carrier for an amount over and above the
amount recovered. Plaintiffs filed their case asking for
such judgment but after more mature consideration
of this statute have concluded that no amount can be
recovered over and above the amount of the recovery
:n the third-party suit.
This is because the statute only refers to the disbursement of the recovery. The recovery is to be disbursed to ( 1) attorney fees ( 2) the carrier, and (3)
the claimant. No provision is made to charge more than
the amount recovered.
At the time of the argument on the Motion for
Summary Judgment this latter was the contention of
the plaintiff and the trial court entered judgment for
the amount held in trust and gave no judgment for an
amount in excess of the fund.
The defendants cited Jay v. Chicago Bridge and
Iron Co., 150 F.2d 247 (1945) and Johanson v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98 (1944), to the
cff ect that the carrier gains no interest in the third- ·
party cause of action until it makes payment on the
a\·.·ard. That is what the statute provided at that time
( t::'-1-58 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933) :
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" * * * if compensation is claimed and awarded
the employer .or insurance carrier having paid
the compensation shall be subrogated to the rights
of
employee or his dependents to recover
agamst such third person; * *"
The present statute provides (35-1-62 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953):
" * **if compensation is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to
pay compensation, the employer or insurance
carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its own name or in the
name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the
personal representative of the deceased, provid ..
ed the employer or carrier may not settle and
release the cause of action without the consent
of the commission."
The carrier obtains an interest in the cause at the
time of the award - when it becomes obligated to pay
compensation.
Defendants argue that the award is to be paid over
a period of six years and apparently that there should
be some discount if paid now. The W orkmens Compensation statutes provide for lump sum payments and
nothing is said about making any discount when this
occurs. For instance, under 35-1-73 U.C.A., 1953 as
amended, it is provided that a widow may receive in a
lump sum one-third of the benefits remaining unpaid
at the time of her remarriage, the other two-thirds to
be paid to some suitable person for the use and benefit
of the other dependents; the weekly benefits to be paid
10

at intervals of not less than four weeks. In the case at
bar, the decedent left a widow and eight children.
Also under Section 35-1-79, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, it is provided that the Commission under special
circumstances, when it is deemed advisable, may commute periodical benefits to one or more lump sum payments.
There is no provision in any of these statutes for
any discounting of the lump sum payments and this
would indicate that under Workmen's Compensation
laws there would be no reason to discount this amount.
The amount of the award is fixed, which is the interest
of the State Insurance Fund in the recovery and based
upon that the fee should be paid. There is no reason
to take the one-third fee from the widow and children
and less than one-third from the State Insurance Fund,
which has been saved the amount of the award.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS, of
Rawlings, Roberts & Black
530 Judge Ifoilding
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Respondents
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